The Florida Star - Happy 200th to the First Amendment, but a Setting Sun for Victims\u27 Privacy - The Florida Star v. B.J.F. by DuBose, Victor Arnell
Mississippi College Law Review 
Volume 10 
Issue 2 Vol. 10 Iss. 2 Article 6 
1990 
The Florida Star - Happy 200th to the First Amendment, but a 
Setting Sun for Victims' Privacy - The Florida Star v. B.J.F. 
Victor Arnell DuBose 
Follow this and additional works at: https://dc.law.mc.edu/lawreview 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Custom Citation 
10 Miss. C. L. Rev. 193 (1989-1990) 
This Case Note is brought to you for free and open access by MC Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Mississippi College Law Review by an authorized editor of MC Law Digital Commons. For more 
information, please contact walter@mc.edu. 
THE FLORIDA STAR-' 'HAPPY 200TH" TO THE FIRST AMENDMENT,
BUT A SETTING SUN FOR VICTIMS' PRIVACY?
The Florida Star v. B.J. E,
109 S. Ct. 2603 (1989)
I. INTRODUCTION
"Short of homicide, [rape] is the 'ultimate violation of self.' "' So began Justice
White's dissent in The Florida Star v. B.J. E2 As an after-effect of that violation, the
sexual assault victim's right in not having her name published in the media can
conflict with the first amendment guarantee of freedom of the press. Both the vic-
tim's privacy and the reinforcement of important public policy considerations, in-
cluding the reporting of violent crimes, can be cast adversarially against the right
to report newsworthy information to the public without threat of censorship or re-
crimination.
The relatively "uncharted state of the law"3 in the publication of truthful infor-
mation versus invasion of privacy in this context was addressed in The Florida Star
v. B.J.F4 In this case, the United States Supreme Court invalidated a state statute
which prevented publication of a sexual assault victim's name and provided civil
liability for its violation. The focus of this note is to examine the recent decisions
which have considered these two competing interests and the larger ramifications
of the holding on the right to privacy for victims of sexual offenses.
II. FACTS
On October 20, 1983, B.J.F. 5 was robbed and raped at knifepoint in Jackson-
ville, Florida, by an unknown assailant.6 B.J.F reported this attack to the police
on the same day, and the department later placed its report of the incident in its
press room, following routine procedure.7 What was apparently not routine was
that the report contained B.J.F.'s full name. A reporter-trainee for the weekly
newspaper, The Florida Star, copied the report in full, including B.J.F's name, 8
despite the presence of signs in the room stating that publication of sexual assault
victims' names was prohibited.' Although The Florida Star had its own policy of
1. The Florida Star v. B.J.F., 109 S. Ct. 2603, 2614 (1989) (White, J., dissenting) (quoting Coker v. Geor-
gia, 433 U.S. 584, 597 (1977)).
2. 109 S. Ct. at 2614 (White, J., dissenting).
3. 109 S. Ct. at 2607 n.5.
4. 109 S. Ct. 2603, 2607 (1989).
5. Although the appellee filed her suit using her full name, both the Florida District Court of Appeal and the
Supreme Court used only her initials in the caption, "[r]especting [her privacy] interests." The Florida Star, 109
S. Ct. at 2605 n.2; 499 So. 2d 883, 883 n.* (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986). The same notation will be used here.
6. 109 S. Ct. at 2605-06.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 2611.
9. Id. at 2605-06, 2616.
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not publishing rape victims' names, B.J.F.'s full name was contained in a "Police
Reports" article published a few days later. 0
A civil action was later filed by B.J.F. in county circuit court against the police
department and The Florida Star, alleging that each party had negligently violated
section 794.03 of Florida Statutes,1 which prohibited publication of names of sex-
ual offense victims.' 2 Testimony was given by B.J.F. at trial concerning her emo-
tional distress over the publication, harassing phone calls which included threats
of another rape, a subsequent move to a different residence, the necessity of
changing her phone number, and her need for counseling and police protection. 13
The trial judge found that section 794.03 did not violate the first amendment and
gave a directed verdict against The Florida Star on the negligence issue due to its
violation of the statute.14 B.J.F. was awarded $100,000 in compensatory and puni-
tive damages by the jury. '"
In affirming the judgment, the First District Court of Appeal, in a brief per cu-
riam opinion, held that a sexual offense victim's name "was of a private nature and
not to be published as a matter of law."16 After the Florida Supreme Court declined
discretionary review,17 The Florida Star appealed to the United States Supreme
Court, which noted probable jurisdiction, 8 and reversed the decision of the Flor-
ida District Court of Appeal. 9 The Court held that in light of the first amendment
freedom of the press,2" no sufficient state interest was served by the imposition of
liability under this statute, particularly where the newspaper lawfully obtained the
truthful information which it published.2'
10. Id. at 2606.
11. The statute read in full:
Unlawful to publish or broadcast information identifying sexual offense victim. -No person shall print,
publish, or broadcast, or cause or allow to be printed, published, or broadcast, in any instrument of mass
communication the name, address, or other identifying fact or information of the victim of any sexual
offense within this chapter. An offense under this section shall constitute a misdemeanor of the second
degree, punishable as provided in § 775.082, § 775.083, or § 775.084.
FLA. STA-r. § 794.03 (1987).
12. 109 S. Ct. at 2605-06. B.J.F. settled with the police department before trial for $2,500. Id. at 2606.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. Compensatory damages of $75,000 were awarded; the balance was for punitive damages, and the
$2,500 settlement with the department was set-off by the judge. Id. The Supreme Court did not address the valid-
ity of the punitive damages award as it was not deemed essential to the holding. Id. at 2613 n.9.
16. The Florida Star v. B.J.F., 499 So. 2d 883, 884 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986). The court cited Doe v. Sara-
sota-Bradenton Fla. Television Co., 436 So. 2d 328 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983), which had stated "there certainly
exist situations in which [FLA. STAT. §1794.03 could be applied to protect privacy interests without running afoul
of the first amendment"; however, the Doe court held that its case was not such a situation and followed Cox
Broadcasting v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975). Doe, 436 So. 2d at 329-30. The Cox decision is discussed infra at
text accompanying notes 23-35.
17. The Florida Star v. B.J.F., 509 So. 2d 1117 (Fla. 1987).
18. The Florida Star v. B.J.F., 109 S. Ct. 216 (1988). Before it noted probable jurisdiction, the Court certi-
fied a question to the Florida Supreme Court as to "whether it had possessed jurisdiction when it declined to hear
the newspaper's case." The Florida Star, 108 S. Ct. 499 (1987); 109 S. Ct. at 2607 n.4. The Florida Supreme
Court held that it did have jurisdiction. 530 So. 2d 286, 287 (Fla. 1988).
19. 109 S. Ct. at 2607.
20. Id. at 2605.
21. Id. at 2613.
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III. BACKGROUND AND LAW
In examining the Supreme Court's decision in The Florida Star, the Court's re-
cent relevant opinions dealing with freedom of the press and the right to privacy of
individuals provide useful insight. This issue concerns truthful publication of in-
formation as invasive of privacy and whether it must yield to the conflicting first
amendment guarantee. In terms of the past case history of the Court, this area
"contrasts markedly with the well-mapped area of defamatory falsehoods."22
A. Cox Broadcasting and its Progeny
The leading case in the truthful information/privacy area is Cox Broadcasting
Corp. v. Cohn.23 In Cox, the Court addressed the "face-off'24 between constitu-
tional freedom of the press and the privacy tort of public disclosure, involving the
publication of private information "which, although wholly true, would be offen-
sive to a person of ordinary sensibilities."25 The father of a deceased rape victim
who had not survived the attack filed suit against the owner of the television sta-
tion which had broadcast the daughter's name on the date of the trial of her alleged
attackers.26 A reporter for the station had obtained the victim's name during a
court recess in which he informally requested that the court clerk show him the
indictments.27
The father sued for invasion of his own privacy in the broadcasting of his
daughter's name, basing his claim on title 26, section 9901 of the Georgia Code,28
which makes such dissemination a misdemeanor violation.29 The United States
Supreme Court reversed the Georgia Supreme Court's holding that the statute was
22. The Florida Star, 109 S. Ct. at 2607 n.5. See, e.g., Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767
(1986); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403 U.S. 29 (1971);
Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
23. 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
24. Id. at 489.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 471-74.
27. Id. at 472 n.3. The reporter testified at trial:
I was handed the indictments ... and was allowed to examine fully this document .... [T]he name of
[the victim] appears in clear type .... [No attempt was made by the clerk or anyone else to withhold
the name and identity of the victim from me ... and the said indictments apparently were available for
public inspection upon request.
Id.
28. Id. at 474. The statute read in full:
It shall be unlawful for any news media or any other person to print and publish, broadcast, televise, or
disseminate through any other medium of public dissemination or cause to be printed and published,
broadcast, televised, or disseminated in any newspaper, magazine, periodical or other publication pub-
lished in this State or through any radio or television broadcast originating in the State the name or iden-
tity of any female who may have been raped or upon whom an assault with intent to commit rape may
have been made. Any person or corporation violating the provisions of this section shall, upon convic-
tion, be punished as for a misdemeanor.
GA. CODE ANN. § 26-9901 (1972).
29. 420 U.S. at 472 n. I (quoting GA. CODE ANN. § 26-9901 (1972)).
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constitutional and that the public interest in revealing the victim's name did not
"rise to the level of First Amendment protection.
While acknowledging that the "sphere of collision" of privacy and free press
presented interests on each side "plainly rooted in the traditions and significant
concerns of our society,"31 the Court stated that the privacy interests fade "[o]nce
true information is disclosed in public court documents, open to public inspec-
tion,' 32 and no sanction can stand which would prohibit the press from publishing
it. 3 The Cox decision focused on the public disclosure of the information the state
had proscribed from publication, the accuracy of the information disseminated,
the possible consequences of disallowing publication of matters already released,
and a "presumption" against the State in that if the State placed the information in
the public record it must have "concluded that the public interest was thereby be-
ing served."34 The broader question of whether accurate publications will always
prevail over contrary restrictions and any privacy interest was not addressed.35
The openness of a court proceeding coupled with the presence of the press were
sufficient factors to invalidate a restrictive pretrial order in Oklahoma Publishing
Co. v. District Court. 36 The order in that case came five days after a preliminary
juvenile hearing in which the press learned the name of a juvenile homicide sus-
pect whom they photographed, and later published and broadcast his name and
identity. 3 Because the reporters were present at the earlier hearing and no action
was taken by the court to exclude them and publications had been made in the in-
terim, 38 the Supreme Court struck down the juvenile court's ex post facto attempt
to prohibit this dissemination as violative of freedom of the press. 39 Truthful publi-
30. Id. at 475-76 (quoting Cox Broadcasting v. Cohn, 231 Ga. 60, 68, 200 S.E.2d 127, 134 (1973)). The
Georgia Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the statute on motion for rehearing after initially declining
to pass on that issue on appeal and holding instead that the action was for a common law public disclosure tort,
and that the statute did not encompass a civil privacy action. On rehearing, that court decided that the statute was
"an authoritative declaration of state policy that the name of a rape victim was not a matter of public concern."
Cox, 420 U.S. at 474-75.
31. 420 U.S. at 491.
32. Id. at 496.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 495-96. The Court stated that such a prohibition would work a hardship on the media in its attempts
to inform the public "and yet stay within the law" and that the restriction would "invite timidity and self-censor-
ship" and possible suppression of otherwise newsworthy material. The responsibility of protecting any privacy
interests warranting the State's attention must be dealt with by the State "by means which avoid public documen-
tation or other exposure of private information." Id. at 496.
35. Id. at 491. Responding to the media appellant's claim that the first and fourteenth amendments would pro-
tect its right to publish regardless of whether the information was obtained from public records or by its own
investigative techniques, the Court noted that, since the case had been decided on more narrow grounds, "we
need not address this broader challenge to the validity of [GA. CODE ANN.] § 26-9901 and of Georgia's right of
action for public disclosure." Id. at 497 n.27. Nonetheless, following Cox, the statute was amended to exclude
"truthful information disclosed in public court documents open to public inspection." GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-
23(c) (1988).
36. 430 U.S. 308 (1977).
37. Id. at 309.
38. Id. at 309, 311.
39. Id. at 311-12 (referencing the first and fourteenth amendments).
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cation and the availability of the information in a public context were again dispos-
itive.4°
The fact that the government had not made the particular privacy matter public
was not controlling in Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co. ,41 in which the Court did
not differentiate between materials that are a matter of public record and informa-
tion which is "lawfully obtained"42 through "routine newspaper reporting tech-
niques. "' In Daily Mail the Court held that imposing criminal sanctions pursuant
to a state statute against a newspaper which had published a juvenile offender's
name did not serve "a state interest of the highest order."" The newspaper had ob-
tained the juvenile's name at the scene of the alleged crime, and the Daily Mail
made its decision to publish only after another newspaper and three radio stations
had run stories on the incident, including the juvenile's name.45
The statute required judicial approval prior to publishing a juvenile's name in
connection with a judicial proceeding and was implemented by a West Virginia
Supreme Court writ of prohibition.46 The state's interest in confidentiality to aid
thejuvenile's rehabilitation and to lessen the future negative consequences of mak-
ing the minor's identity public was insufficient, according to the Court, to justify
imposing criminal sanctions.47 In addition, the statute failed to comply with con-
stitutional requirements and achieve its stated purpose because it applied only to
newspapers and not all forms of public media.48
The Supreme Court has also extended first amendment protection to the accu-
rate publication of confidential judicial fitness proceedings, where the news media
was absent from the inquiry49 and the information printed had apparently "fall[en]
into the hands" of the media.5" The violation of a state statute prohibiting release of
such information constituted a misdemeanor, but the Court held that this type of
publication "lies near the core of the First Amendment" and prohibited such pun-
ishment.5" While state interests in preserving the confidential nature of the pro-
40. Id. at 310-11 (citing Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 496(1975)). See also Craig v. Har-
ney, 331 U.S. 367, 374 (1947) ("A trial is a public event. What transpires in the court room is public property.
... Those who see and hear what transpired can report it with impunity.").
41. 443 U.S. 97 (1979).
42. Id. at 106.
43. Id. at 103.
44. Id. at 105-06.
45.Id. at 99-100.
46. Id. at 98, 100.
47. Id. at 104.
48. Id. at 104-05.
49. Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 837-38 (1978). The newspaper had pub-
lished a story reporting the proceedings of the Virginia Judicial Inquiry and Review Commission, which investi-
gates complaints lodged against judges; the story named the judge who was the subject of that particular inquiry.
Id. at 830 n.1, 831.
50. Id. at 849 (Stewart, J., concurring). Nowhere in the opinion is the source of the information actually
stated.
51. Id. at 838.
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ceedings were "legitimate," they were insufficient to justify encroachment on
protected first amendment freedoms .52
The state interest in protecting victims was also deemed insufficient to uphold a
mandatory-closure rule in Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court .53 At issue was a
state statute which had been interpreted as requiring the clearing of the courtroom
during a minor victim's testimony in a sexual offense trial."' The underlying inter-
est of the state was safeguarding the victim's well-being during testimony and "the
encouragement of minor victims of sex crimes to come forward and give accurate
testimony. '5' The Court held that the mandatory nature of the closure rule ren-
dered it unconstitutional under the first amendment and stated that only a case-by-
case basis could justify such a restriction, if at all. 8 Coupled with the holdings in
Cox57 and Oklahoma Publishing,8 this decision allows the press, if permitted to be
present at the minor victim's testimony, to publish the name and testimony of the
victim since they are no longer "confidential."
B. Truthful Public Disclosure of Private Facts
1. Elements of the Action
Actions for damages resulting from the publication of a sexual offense victim's
name have been brought either as a common-law privacy tort59 or under a relevant
state statute. 60
The common-law invasion of privacy action most relevant to truthful publica-
tion is one for the "public disclosure" of "private facts." 6 According to Prosser, the
elements of such a tort are (1) the public disclosure (2) of private facts (3) which
are "highly offensive and objectionable to a reasonable person of ordinary sensibil-
52. Id. at 838, 841. See also Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 350(1966) (responsible press "as the hand-
maiden of . . .judicial administration" subjects that process to "extensive public scrutiny and criticism");
Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 270-71 (1941) ("shielding judges from published criticism" would likely
foster more contempt than respect).
53. 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
54. Id. at 602.
55. Id. at 609; see also id. at 607.
56. Id. at 608, 611 n.27. The dissent stated that the Court advanced "a disturbing paradox" in that "states are
permitted. . . to mandate the closure of all proceedings. . .to protect a 17-year-old charged with rape, [but]
they are not permitted to require the closing. . . in order to protect an innocent child who has been raped.
Id. at 612 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
57. Cox, 420 U.S. 469, 496 (1975), and supra note 33 and accompanying text.
58. Oklahoma Publishing, 430 U.S. 308, 311 (1977), and supra note 36 and accompanying text.
59. See supra note 30, and infra note 61. See also the noted early article on the privacy right, Warren & Bran-
deis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REv. 193 (1890).
60. See supra, at notes 11, 28.
61. W. PRossEs & W. KEETON, THE LAw OF ToRTs 856 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter W. PossER]. The elements
of the other three kinds of privacy actions identified by Prosser are beyond the scope of this note. See W. PRo-
SSER, regarding these actions: appropriation of name or likeness, at 851-54; intrusion into another's seclusion, at
854-56; and the placement of one in a false light "in the public eye," at 863-66. Id. See also Prosser, Privacy, 48
CAuF. L. REv. 383 (1960) [hereinafter Prosser, Privacy]; Bloustein, Privacy As an Aspect of Human Dignity: An
Answer to Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 962 (1964) [hereinafter Bloustein]; Hill, Defamation and Privacy
Under the First Amendment, 76 CoLuM. L. REv. 1205 (1976) [hereinafter Hill].
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ities."62 The Second Restatement of Torts adds a fourth requirement in that the mat-
ter is not to be "of legitimate concern to the public."63
The attention given to the private facts must be something more than mere
publication to a third person and mean "publicity" as in disseminated to "the public
at large" through some form of mass communication or publication.64 The public-
ity must concern "private" rather than "public" facts to be actionable,6" and the
availability of the information in a public record has proven dispositive in the find-
ing of no liability.66 The length of time between when the reported incidents oc-
curred and the actual public revelation of such has also been held to be a decisive
factor.67
The actionable publicity must involve a matter which is "highly offensive and
objectionable to a reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities."68 Information on a
person's normal comings and goings, such as a business trip, or as part of a crowd
photographed on a busy street usually would not be considered offensive, while
the reporting of one's more intimate activities could meet the reasonable person
threshold asjudged by the standards and mores of the particular community.6" The
Supreme Court in Time, Inc. v. Hill,70 while stating that "[t]he risk of [exposure of
the self to others] is an essential incident of life in a society which places a primary
value on freedom of speech and of press,"7' also recognized that even truthful ex-
posure could go too far and that "[r]evelations may be so intimate and so unwar-
ranted in view of the victim's position as to outrage the community's notions of
decency. "72
If a claimant met the public disclosure tort criteria, both Cox73 and the common
law74 require the additional showing that the matter is not of legitimate public con-
62. W. PROSSER, supra note 61, at 856-57.
63. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (SECOND)], which reads:
One who gives publicity to a matter concerning the private life of another is subject to liability to the other
for invasion of his privacy, if the matter publicized is of a kind that
(a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable person,
and
(b) is not of legitimate concern to the public.
Id. See also Hill, supra note 61, at 1258-62.
64. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 63, at § 652D comment a. See Bloustein, supra note 61, at 979-80
(distinguishing the public disclosure tort from a defamation action in that with the latter, communication of the
matter to a single person satisfies the publication requirement).
65. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 63, at § 652D comment b; Prosser, Privacy, supra note 61, at 394-96.
66. See, e.g., Cox, 420 U.S. at 496; Oklahoma Publishing, 430 U.S. at 310. But see Cape Publications, Inc.
v. Hitchner, 514 So. 2d 1136, 1138 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
67. See, e.g., Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp., 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 711 (1940)
(publication during adult's life of information regarding his childhood); Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285, 297
P. 91 (Dist. Ct. App. 1931) (seven years).
68. W. PROSSER, supra note 61, at 857.
69. Id.; RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 63, at § 652D comment c.
70. 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
71. Id. at 388.
72. Id. at 383 n.7 (quoting Sidis, 113 F.2d at 809).
73. Cox, 420 U.S. at 496.
74. W. PROSSER, supra note 61, at 860-62.
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cern.7" The right of the public "to know" and the right of the press to so inform the
public cannot be abridged regarding newsworthy information,7" particularly as
where in Cox, the information is already available in a public record;77 however,
such a right may not be without its limits.78
2. Illustrative Cases
The earliest reported case brought under a state statute was State v. Evjue,79 in
which the Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld the statute because the "slight restric-
tion of the freedom of the press"8 was justified when balanced against the nature
of the crime of rape, the situation of the victim, and the burden on the state absent
the prohibition.81 Although this case was a criminal proceeding brought by the dis-
trict attorney rather than a civil action of the victim, the court stated that the stat-
ute's intent was "to save [the victim] from embarrassment and offensive
publicity."82
In the more recent case of Doe v. Sarasota-Bradenton Florida Television, Inc. ,83
the plaintiffs claim was based on a statute rather than a public disclosure tort, and
the newsworthy/public record element was not overcome since the press had ac-
cess to the information in question -the identity of a rape victim.84 The court fol-
lowed the Cox holding in that in Doe the information was "already open to public
view" and no liability could be found under section 794.03 of the Florida Stat-
75. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 63, at § 652D comment d.
76. Id.
77. Cox, 420 U.S. at 496.
78. See, e.g., Barberv. Time, Inc., 348 Mo. 1199, 1203, 1207, 159 S.W.2d 291,293,295 (1942) (informa-
tion published in a magazine on a rare disease including name and picture of woman suffering from same, which
involved an eating disorder ("[sihe eats for ten"); the court held that though the disease itself could be of public
interest, the name of the woman was not).
79. 253 Wis. 146, 33 N.W.2d 305 (1948).
80. Id. at 162, 33 N.W.2d at 312.
81. Id. at 161-62, 33 N.W.2d at 312. The statute read:
Any person who shall publish or cause to be published in any newspaper, magazine, periodical or cir-
cular, except as the same may be necessary in the institution or prosecution of any civil or criminal court
proceeding, or in the compilation of the records pertaining thereto, the identity of a female who may have
been raped or subjected to any similar criminal assault, shall be punished by imprisonment in the county
jail for not more than one year or by fine not exceeding five hundred dollars, or by both such fine and
imprisonment.
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 348.412 (1945).
82. 253 Wis. at 155, 33 N.W.2d at 309. See also id. at 161, 333 N.W.2d at 312. The court also stated that in
relation to preventing the offensive publicity and assisting the authorities with prosecuting the rape crime, "the
legislature of this and 19 other states" had formulated such laws. Id. at 155, 33 N.W.2dat 309. For a revealing
accounting of the "19 states" contention, see Franklin, A Constitutional Problem in Privacy Protection, 16 STAN.
L. REv. 107, 131, 132 n. 108 (1963) (examination of briefs filed in Evjue and a separate study each reveal only
four states with such statutes; "mystery of the figure 19 remains unsolved"). The appellant's brief in The Forida
Star also lists four states as having criminal statutes prohibiting the publication of names of sexual assault vic-
tims: FLA. STAT. § 794.03 (1987); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-23 (1988); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-730 (1976); Wis.
CODE ANN. § 942.02 (1987). Appellant's Brief at 10, The Florida Star v. B.J.F., 109 S. Ct. 2603 (1989) (No. 87-
329). See also supra, notes 11, 28.
83. 436 So. 2d 328 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
84. Id. at 329. The defendant's television news team videotaped the victim's courtroom testimony and dis-
played that footage on the evening news while also mentioning the victim's name. Id.
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utes.85 The court did recognize that, absent such a public disclosure, a privacy
action could lie, and stated that it was even provided for under the state constitu-
tion, though that right appears to apply to "governmental intrusion."86 The fact of
becoming newsworthy 87 can elevate one's status to that of legitimate public inter-
est, notwithstanding that the information published is embarrassing and in "bad
taste.
88
In Hyde v. City of Columbia89 the plaintiff was a victim of an abduction attempt
by an unknown assailant. The plaintiff sued the local government and media de-
fendants for negligently publishing her name while her attacker remained at
large.9" In reversing the trial court's dismissal of her claim, the appellate court held
that the victim's name was not an "official report" subject to publication, despite
the fact that the local police department had already released her name to the me-
dia.91 In addition, the court stated that the media had a "duty" to the victim "to use
reasonable care not to give likely occasion for a third party ...to do injury to the
plaintiff by the publication." 92 The court focused on balancing "the public right to
know and the individual right to personal security,"93 and neither Cox, Daily Mail,
nor Oklahoma Publishing were even mentioned in the opinion. 94
The privacy rights of a rape victim were sufficient to warrant withholding of
evidence requested by the media in In re Application of KSTP Television.9" The sta-
tion wanted copies of videotapes, shown at trial, which were made by the victim's
attacker and showed conduct preliminary to the attacks."9 The court chose to ad-
dress first amendment claims as "form rather than substance" issues, and declined
to release the tapes, noting that the station already had possession of the informa-
tion contained in the tapes but had no right to the information in the form disclosed
at trial .17 The court also stated that release of the tapes would infringe on the "pre-
cious privacy rights" of the victim, although it referred to the victim by name
throughout the opinion. 8
85. Id. at 329-30. This is the same statute on which B .J. F's claim was based in The Florida Star; see supra note
II and accompanying text.
86. Doe, 436 So. 2d at 330. The constitutional provision reads as follows: "Right of privacy- Every natural
person has the right to be let alone and free from governmental intrusion into his private life except as otherwise
provided herein. This section shall not be construed to limit the public's right of access to public records and
meetings as provided by law." FLA. CoNsT. art. I, § 23.
87. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 63, at § 652D comment f.
88. Id. Cape Publications, Inc. v. Bridges, 423 So. 2d 426, 427-28 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 893 (1983) (publication of hostage's picture taken at crime scene where victim covered only with "dish
towel" held not invasive of her privacy).
89. 637 S.W.2d 251 (Mo. App. 1982).
90. Id. at 253.
91. Id. at 253, 269.
92. Id. at 269.
93. Id.
94. Cf Diaz v. Oakland Tribune, Inc., 139 Cal. App. 3d 118, 131-32, 188 Cal. Rptr. 762, 771 (1983) (dis-
tinguishing Cox, as information in question was not shown to be part of public record).
95. 504 F Supp. 360 (D. Minn. 1980).
96. Id. at 361.
97. Id. at 363-64.
98. Id. at 362.
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In Mississippi the public disclosure tort was recognized in the context of publi-
cation of names and photographs of mentally retarded students in a news story
concerning a special education class.99 In Deaton v. Delta Democrat Publishing
Co., the Mississippi Supreme Court held that the identities of these students were
"unavailable to the public" under state law and, therefore, were not part of a public
record so as to allow publication under Cox. 100 This case was pre-Daily Mail, how-
ever, which allowed publication of information gathered through routine reporting
methods, and might not have the same result today.' 01
IV. INSTANT CASE
In The Florida Star v. B.J. F ,102 the United States Supreme Court addressed the
issue of imposition of liability on a newspaper which had published the name of a
rape victim lawfully obtained from a posted police report."03 The Court analyzed
this case in terms of a principle delineated in Daily Mail: "[I]f a newspaper law-
fully obtains truthful information about a matter of public significance then state
officials may not constitutionally punish publication of the information, absent a
need to further a state interest of the highest order."" 4 Cox did not directly control
since the instant case involved information obtained prior to commencement of
any criminal pre-trial or trial proceedings."' Instead, the Court stated that "three
separate considerations" of the Daily Mail principle were particularly relevant.
1 6
First, the government has means available to restrict or prevent the release of
information such as a rape victim's name and can develop liability measures to
prohibit the government itself from releasing this information-a "less drastic
means" than punishing the press for truthful publication of lawfully obtained ma-
terial.107 Second, if the information is already public, then punishing the media for
further dissemination is "relatively unlikely" to serve the interests which the state
ostensibly seeks to protect.' Third, "timidity and self-censorship"109 on the part
of the media could result, with an ensuing "onerous obligation" to pick out accept-
able material from publicly released records, if this type of punishment were al-
99. Deaton v. Delta Democrat Publishing Co., 326 So. 2d 471 (Miss. 1976).
100. Id. at 473.
101. Daily Mail, 443 U.S. at 103. See also supra note 41 and accompanying text.
102. 109 S. Ct. 2603 (1989).
103. Id. at 2605.
104. Id. at 2609 (quoting Daily Mail, 443 U.S. at 103).
105. The Florida Star, 109 S. Ct. at 2608.
106. Id. at 2609.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 2610. The Court reiterated the "presumption" of Cox: By placing the victim's name in the public
record, the state is "presumed to have concluded that the public interest was thereby being served." Id., quoting
Cox, 420 U.S. at 495.
109. 109 S. Ct. at 2610 (quoting Cox, 420 U.S. at 496).
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lowed. 1 The Court, applying Daily Mail, concluded that these considerations
required reversal of the lower court's affirmation of liability.111
The first inquiry to make in such a case is whether the information was lawfully
obtained, was truthful, and concerned "a matter of public significance." '112 The
Court answered this inquiry in the affirmative, since the information had come
from a released police report and concerned "a matter of paramount public im-
port," i.e., the commission of a reported violent crime.113 The second inquiry,
whether a state need "of the highest order"'14 would be served by imposing liabil-
ity, was answered in the negative for "three independent reasons." 1 ' First, the in-
formation was lawfully obtained, and was initially made public as a result of the
police department's erroneous listing of B.J.F's name in its report which was
posted in the department's press room. 1'6 The only source of relief for a victim in
this instance was from the government, not the media." 7 Second, the statute's per
se negligence standard of imposing liability automatically upon publication was
too broad, giving the "perverse result" that truthful publications are less protected
than defamatory falsehoods of private persons, which require an ordinary negli-
gence finding.1"8 Finally, the Court interpreted the statute as facially underinclu-
sive in that it applied only to an "instrument of mass communication," and not
"evenhandedly, to the small-time disseminator as well as the media giant," only
the latter of which could be seen as properly advancing the state's interest by pro-
hibiting publication of truthful information. "' The Court thus reversed the finding
of liability against the media defendant, but also cautioned that its holding was
limited, and did not hold that truthful publication warrants automatic constitu-
tional protection, "or even that a State may never punish publication of the name of
a victim of a sexual offense."
120
Justice Scalia concurred in part and in the judgment, and stated that the law was
not inclusive enough in that it failed to include dissemination of the information by
the individual. 121 "This law has every appearance of a prohibition that society is
prepared to impose upon the press but not upon itself."
122
110. 109S. Ct. at 2610.
111. 109 S. Ct. at 2610. Justice Marshall wrote the opinion of the Court and was joined by Justices Brennan,
Blackmun, Stevens, and Kennedy. Justice Scalia concurred in part and concurred in the judgment. Id. at 2605.
See also supra note 16 and accompanying text.
112. Id. at 2610 (quoting Daily Mail, 443 U.S. at 103).
113. Id. at 2610-11.
114. Id. at 2611 (quoting Daily Mail, 443 U.S. at 103).
115. Id. at 2611.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 2611-12.
118. Id. at 2612. The Court also stated that, under the statute, liability could be imposed even where a victim
"voluntarily called public attention to the offense." Id.
119. Id. at 2612-13.
120. Id. at 2613.
121. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
122. Id. at 2614 (Scalia, J., concurring).
1990]
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LA W REVIEW
Justice White dissented123 and attacked the "three independent reasons" relied
upon by the majority in its result.124 White pointed out that the press room had
posted signs stating that such a publication was unlawful and that the Star's re-
porter-trainee understood that fact, and since "mistakes happen,"12' "simple stand-
ards of decency" should have restrained publication.12 The negligence per se
nature of the statute, White asserted, reflects "that the standard of care has been
set by the legislature, instead of the courts,"' 7 and that the jury's finding of "reck-
less indifference" on the part of The Star (and thereby awarding punitive damages)
went beyond an ordinary negligence standard.128 Third, the "underinclusiveness"
finding of the majority was misplaced in that past cases focused on whether all
facets of the media are covered by a statute, and the Florida law accomplished
this.129 Any action against a "neighborhood gossip" not covered by the statute
could likely be provided for in the state's common law of privacy.130
White concluded by stating that "the Court accepts appellant's invitation
to obliterate one of the most note-worthy legal inventions of the 20th-Century: the
tort of the publication of private facts," and doubting whether any private facts can
ever be protected from publication.13'
V. ANALYSIS
A. The Cox to Star Progression
The Florida Star is the latest in a line of cases which have all explicitly avoided
the question of whether liability can ever be imposed under the first amendment
for the truthful publication of lawfully obtained information, and yet in an unbro-
ken line have held for freedom of the press and against the privacy rights of the
individual and/or the interests of the state. 132 Despite the "limited" nature of the
Florida Star holding and those of the related cases, a fair question to ask is whether
all the "dots" have been connected so that there now is, in fact, a sealed, impen-
etrable "wrap" for first amendment press rights regarding publication of truthful
information, at least as applied to victims of sexual assault and those similarly situ-
ated.
The preparation of police reports following the reporting of a sexual assault by a
victim and the requisite appearance of that victim at the appropriate time in the
123. White was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor. Id. at 2614.
124. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
125. 109 S. Ct. at 2616 (White, J., dissenting) (the mistake having been the initial posting of the police report
containing B.J.F.'s full name).
126. 109 S. Ct. at 2615-16 (White, J., dissenting).
127. Id. at 2617 (White, J., dissenting).
128. Id. at 2616-17 (White, J., dissenting).
129. Id. at 2617 (White, J., dissenting).
130. Id.
131. Id. at 2618 (White, J., dissenting). White had earlier stated that the "trilogy" relied on by the majority,
Cox (which opinion White authored), Daily Mail, and Oklahoma Publishing, did not require "the harsh outcome
reached today." Id. at 2614.
132. Cox, 420 U.S. at 491; Daily Mail, 443 U.S. at 105; Oklahoma Publishing, 430 U.S. at 310; Landmark
Communications, 435 U.S. at 837, 840.
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judicial proceedings which would ensue are foregone conclusions, although the
latter is contingent upon the booking of a suspect. The progression which follows
under The Florida Star and the related cases is thus: if Cox allows publication of
truthful information acquired from public records;133 and Daily Mail extends this
right to information gathered through journalistic techniques rather than just from
public records;'34 and Globe Newspaper makes closure of a sexual offense trial du-
bious at best,1 35 particularly in light of the "presumption of openness" and right of
the press and public to access to criminal trials under Richmond Newspapers, Inc.
v. Virginia;38 and Oklahoma Publishing dictates that whatever is obtained at a
court proceeding is free and open to publication;1 37 and Landmark Communica-
tions reinforces all of the above by invalidating criminal punishment of "strangers
to the [judicial proceedings]" who, while not present at the inquiry, publish confi-
dential but truthful information not unlawfully obtained;' 38 and, finally, The Flor-
ida Star similarly protects information released, albeit inadvertently, prior to the
commencement of any proceedings, 139 then perhaps, there is nothing left .Nothing
for the victim, that is, except the stark realization that if she chooses to follow the
course of reporting the crime against her, she must also be prepared to endure not
only that process but also the resulting media exposure, absent any "grace" from
the press. In addition, nothing may remain to litigate in this arena: while leaving
itself an "out" by refusing to broadly declare all truthful publications constitu-
tional, the Court has with Star and its predecessors effectively foreclosed this area
from any viable challenge by a private facts case, a move marked by a cautious
deliberateness but also perhaps by a glacier-like finality. 4 '
B. The Star Holding Itself
In its "limited" holding in Florida Star, the Court stated its concern for the broad
implications of a finding of liability in this situation: "timidity and self-censorship"
by the press. 41 The Court coupled this concern with disapproval of the statutorily
imposed negligence per se standard and what it termed as the "facial underinclu-
siveness" of that statute. 42 The Court appears to be imposing a negligence per se
standard itself on the state. If a government official or entity inadvertently or in-
133. Cox, 420 U.S. at 496.
134. Daily Mail, 443 U.S. at 103, 105.
135. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 610 (1982).
136. 448 U.S. 555, 573 (1980).
137. Oklahoma Publishing, 430 U.S. at 310.
138. Landmark Communications, 435 U.S. at 837-38.
139. The Florida Star, 109 S. Ct. at 2605, 2608. The holding in The Florida Star also declares the three-fold
interests of the victim's privacy, her physical safety interest in not giving the assailant the opportunity to learn her
name and address, and the state's interest in having victims report such crimes to be inadequate to support liabil-
ity for publication under these circumstances. Id.
140. See, e.g., Justice White's comments at 109 S. Ct. 2619: "[In Cox] we acknowledged the possibility that
the First Amendment may prevent a State from ever subjecting the publication of truthful but private information
to civil liability. Today, we hit the bottom of the slippery slope." Id. Perhaps it is ironic that White authored the
majority opinion in Cor.
141. Id. at 2610, 2612 (quoting Cox, 420 U.S. at 496).
142.Id. at 2612-13.
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tentionally releases a victim's name in any form whatsoever, it is the government
that has then "muffed" the situation and which must suffer any resulting conse-
quences from legal action by the victim, while the press is then "cleared" to publish
at its own volition. Consequently, the government is the only wrongdoer in this
instance, with any would-be responsibility which could be imposed upon the me-
dia disallowed as a chilling effect on freedom of the press and as an implied cen-
sorship upon its routine operations.143 Assuming that the publication of the
victim's name is, at a minimum, "improper," the Court has stated an old idiom in a
new way: "two wrongs do make a right [to publish]," and any possibility of the im-
position of elementary joint liability principles for the respective miscues was ap-
parently not within the scope of the Court's deliberation.
While the use of the statute's per se negligence standard could lead to imposition
of liability without a specific finding of fault, the Court in the instant case chose to
address that "big picture" rather than the facts at hand, since the jury found the
Star's action justified imposing punitive damages.'"
The Court's characterization of the statute as facially underinclusive was based
upon its not applying to the "smalltime disseminator," such as "the backyard gossip
who tells 50 people that don't have to know."14 This view appears to be inconsis-
tent with the Court's holding in Daily Mail, where the focus was on the fact that the
pertinent statute only prohibited one form of the media (newspapers) from publi-
cation of juveniles' names, rather than applying to the media across the board. 14
The apparent implication of the Star holding and Scalia's concurrence 47 is that any
effort to address statutorily such dissemination must also include single individuals
having propensities for spreading "gossip" among neighborhoods or communities,
despite the fact that no such mention was made in the earlier Daily Mail case,"
and notwithstanding the "evenhandedness" of the Florida statute's inclusion of all
the media. 4 9
The state's goal of encouraging victims of sexual offense crimes to report these
incidents was not sufficient to justify liability in the Star case. Since this interest
and that of the victim in having her attacker brought to justice are not adequate
reasons under Star for retaining anonymity, the victim is left with the choice of
reporting the crime and accepting possible public exposure, or not reporting at all.
143. Id. at 2612 (noting the press reliance on news releases as a "routine" journalistic technique).
144. Id. at 2616-17 (White, J., dissenting), and at 2613 n.9.
145. Id. at 2612-13 (referencing statement of appellee B.J.F.'s counsel at oral argument).
146. Daily Mail, 443 U.S. at 104-05.
147. 109 S. Ct. at 2613 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("Nor is it at all clear, as I think it must be to validate this stat-
ute, that Florida's general privacy law would prohibit such gossip.").
148. Daily Mail, 443 U.S. at 104-05.
149. 109 S. Ct. at 2617. "It excludes neighborhood gossips . because presumably the Florida Legislature
has determined that neighborhood gossips do not pose the danger and intrusion to rape victims that 'instrument[s]
of mass communication' do." Id. (White, J., dissenting) (brackets in original). See also L. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 888-90 (2d ed. 1988) (nothing in the Cox and Daily Mail decisions "remotely suggests"
that the "government must exalt an abstract right to know, here reduced to a right to gossip, above the deeper
concerns of personhood"). It would be interesting to know whether that noted commentator would amend that
statement in light of The Florida Star.
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This dilemma could lead to a "de facto" deprivation of the victim's fourteenth
amendment right to due process under the law, a point not addressed in the Star
opinion.50
Juxtaposed against the above points on the Star holding and the Cox/Star pro-
gression are the candid concerns of a press free enough to report the information it
lawfully obtains. Had a contrary result in Star and the other similar cases been
reached, the "domino progression" expounded above could work in the opposite
direction and result in a considerable restriction on the freedom of the press."5' In-
deed, if the plaintiffs in Cox and Florida Star had succeeded, it could be supposed
that victims of other crimes or other unfortunate happenings could attempt to in-
sist on anonymity and an accompanying right of action upon revelation of their
identities.5 2 The Court in Florida Star also mentioned the potential for abuse in
situations in which the comprehensive liability under the statute is imposed where
"questions have arisen whether the victim fabricated an assault by a particular per-
son."153
C. Contrasted Situations
An area of the law in which closure of part of a trial has been upheld against first
amendment freedom of the press is the preservation of trade secrets, as evidenced
by Standard & Poor's Corp. v. Commodity Exchange, Inc. 1' The court in this case
kept sealed a transcript containing trade secrets of Standard & Poor's, ruling
against an order seeking the information by a trade newspaper service.'55 While
the subject matter and the factual setting are quite different from that of B.J.F. in
Star and other sexual assault victims, the case raises the serious question of
whether trade secrets of corporate giants are afforded more protection than the
identity of such victims, and, if answered in the affirmative, why. One can only
speculate as to whether the Supreme Court would afford the same treatment to the
interests of corporations in protecting trade secrets as was given to the victim and
the state in Florida Star.
Whether a participant in the federal witness protection program could establish
an invasion of privacy/public disclosure action for the publishing of that person's
real name and location was held to be a jury issue in Capra v. Thoroughbred Racing
Association.' 6 The court stated that "[w]hile the federal witness protection pro-
gram cannot by itself overcome the First Amendment, the program possesses
150. See L. TRIBE, supra note 149, at 889-90.
151. The Florida Star, 109 S. Ct. at 2610; Cox, 420 U.S. at 496.
152. See, e.g., Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 610 ("Surely it cannot be suggested that minor victims of sex
crimes are the only crime victims who, because of publicity attendant to criminal trials, are reluctant to come
forward and testify.").
153. The Florida Star, 109 S. Ct. at 2612. Whether such a concern is justified in the actuality of the sexual
assault field is beyond the scope of this note. But see Franklin, Privacy Protection, 16 STAN. L. REV. 107, 137-38
(1963).
154. 541 F Supp. 1273 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
155. Id. at 1278. The court relied on Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980), in holding
that the right to access to a civil trial was not absolute. Id. at 1275-76.
156. 787 F.2d 463 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1017 (1986).
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some social values that weigh against unlimited free speech . . . . ""' In this case
the operative issue at trial would be the "newsworthiness" of publishing the wit-
ness' name and location as determined by "(1) the social value of the facts pub-
lished, (2) the depth of the publication's intrusion into ostensibly private affairs,
and (3) the extent to which the party voluntarily assumed a position of public noto-
riety.'"158 The court was applying the newsworthiness requirement of Virgil v.
Time, Inc., 19 which used a Restatement of Torts (Second) standard in determining
whether publication of private facts was newsworthy and therefore privileged.160
Had the Court in Florida Star used a similar standard for a person arguably pos-
sessing as viable a privacy interest as the witness in Capra and the "body surfer" in
Virgil,161 perhaps the victim's name at the very least would have been adjudged
worthy of protection.
Although the representative cases did not reach the Supreme Court, the inter-
ests of corporate trade secrets, a federal witness protection program participant, a
maverick body surfer, and jurors162 have received more favorable judicial consid-
eration in the lower courts than the rape victim in Florida Star.
VI. ILLUSTRATIONS AND CONCLUSION
The Florida Star v. B.J. F 63 presented the competing interests of a free press
and the right to privacy in a context in which both the original release of the vic-
tim's name by the police department and the subsequent publication by the news-
paper were apparently inadvertent acts, the latter's publication in violation of its
own internal policy.164 An example of a repeated intentional policy of publishing
identities of rape victims was recently addressed in a television broadcast of the
157. Id. at 465.
158. Id. at 464-65 (applying California law).
159. 527 F.2d 1122 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 998 (1976). Virgil involved a body surfer who sued
the parent company of Sports Illustrated after publication of a story on the surfer's ventures and exploits. While
originally agreeing to interviews with the writer and not disputing the authenticity of the article's content, the
surfer later recanted his consent to the story's publication. The magazine published the story over his objections.
The Ninth Circuit vacated the district court's denial of summary judgment for the publisher, remanding the case
for consideration of the newsworthiness standard (see infr& at note 158) as applied to the facts. Id. at 1123-24,
1129, 1131-32. On remand, the district court granted summary judgment for the publisher. 424 F. Supp. 1286,
1290 (S.D. Cal. 1976) ("the facts themselves-putting out cigarettes in his mouth and diving off stairs to impress
women, hurting himself in order to collect unemployment so as to have time for body surfing," while "generally
unflattering," do not reach the level of protection from publication). 424 F Supp. at 1289.
160. The Virgil court used commentfof a 1967 tentative draft. While that comment was later eliminated, the
court stated that it was "directly incorporated" in the later § 652D version. 527 F.2d at 1129 n. 10. The commentf
used reads as follows:
In determining what is a matter of legitimate public interest, account must be taken of the customs and
conventions of the community; and in the last analysis what is proper becomes a matter of the community
mores. The line is to be drawn when the publicity ceases to be the giving of information to which the
public is entitled, and becomes a morbid and sensational prying into private lives for its own sake, with
which a reasonable member of the public, with decent standards, would say that he had no concern.
Id.
161. See supra note 159.
162. See United States v. Gurney, 558 F.2d 1202 (5th Cir. 1977) (protection ofjurors' privacy by not releasing
jury list was within discretion of trial judge). Id. at 1210 n. 12.
163. 109 S. Ct. 2603 (1989).
164. Id. at 2606, 2616.
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program A Current Affair. 165 The news story concerned a Washington state news-
paper which follows such a policy and the ramifications of the policy within that
community. A local rape crisis counselor interviewed on the program stated that
victims whose names were published later received obscene telephone calls and
obscene mail,1 66 and said "how can that be helping."1 67 The counselor was also
presently assisting two victims who would not report their attacks due to the news-
paper's policy. The local county prosecutor stated that the practice leads to the im-
plication that a rapist can commit rapes in that community while knowing that his
victims will not want to report the assault.1 68 The newspaper's publisher had
printed two editorials defending the paper's policy. 
169
The Washington community's situation may be an extreme example of the pro-
tection afforded the press under Cox, The Florida Star, and related cases. How-
ever, it is real. The Court's reluctance to "box in" the freedom of the press under
these cases and the resultant holdings on the side of an expansive first amendment
interpretation represent tough decisions which carry public policy considerations
on each side of the competing interests of the "right to know" and the privacy of the
individual. Possibly only the more cryptic cynics17 would want decisions which
would create in actuality the chilling effect of "timidity and self-censorship"
warned against in these decisions."' The Star majority also stated its recognition
of the "tragic reality of rape"172 and, in a somewhat ironic twist, never used the
victim's full name in the opinion. 173 In deciding for the press and against a statute it
termed defective, the Court also placed the responsibility for keeping a victim's
name private, if it can be done at all, squarely on the shoulders of the government
which has access to the victim's identity in the first place,' 74 as was done in Cox. 175
If the Court's pronouncement on the government's means of keeping the vic-
tim's identity out of the public domain is carried to its logical conclusion, particu-
larly in light of the "progression" noted above, 6 a "secret trial" would be needed
165. A Current Affair (television broadcast of September 19, 1989), 20th-Century Fox Television Syndication
Co.
166. Addresses of victims are also published. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. Little attention was given in the broadcast to the newspaper's source of information; presumably the
information came from law enforcement reports.
170. As possibly expressed in the following:
I make my living off the Evening News
Just give me something -something I can use
People love it when you lose,
They love dirty laundry ....
Don Henley, Dirty Laundry, from the LP "I Can't Stand Still" (Elektra/Asylum Records, 1982).
171. Florida Star, 109 S. Ct. at 2610; Cox, 420 U.S. at 496.
172. 109 S. Ct. at 2611.
173. See 109 S. Ct. at 2605 n.2, and supra note 5.
174. 109 S. Ct. at 2611 (government had "far more limited means" of keeping identity private than by "extreme
step of punishing truthful speech").
175. Cox, 420 U.S. at 496 (to protect private information "States must respond by means which avoid public
documentation").
176. See supra text accompanying notes 133-40.
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to truly ensure the victim's identity remained "private." Such proceedings would
have to be carried out over any objections of the defendants, including deprivation
of their sixth amendment rights,177 "which would pose a constitutional problem at
least as serious as the one the Court believed itself to be resolving [in Cox]."78 The
mandatory closure which would be necessitated would also present the same kind
of situation that was invalidated in Globe Newspaper. 179 If the Court in Florida Star
had adopted a case-by-case requirement of evaluating a victim's privacy needs as
it had recommended in a different context in Globe Newspaper,18 the Court could
have invalidated the Florida statute (and B.J.F.'s claim) while still allowing the
theory of action to survive. Instead, the difficulty of keeping victims' names out of
any public record and the unlikelihood and ill-advisedness of "secret trials" leaves
the existence of the tort of public disclosure in extreme doubt, at least with regard
to sexual assault victims.
Despite its pronouncement of another "limited" holding,181 the Court's decision
in The Florida Star v. B.J. F is apparently the death-knell for any hopes of privacy
for rape victims. The victim can know for a near certainty that the reporting of her
tragedy will also mark the beginning of life in the public eye, absent a collective
and continuous show of discretion by all facets of the press. Whether a statute can
be drafted or a form of action fashioned which will pass the scrutiny of the Court
and still provide a remedy for the victim is doubtful. Until the simple dichotomy of
separating the rape victim's name, as a privacy interest, from the reported crime,
as a newsworthy event, is recognized judicially -even if that name is by necessity
in some form of the public record -then the rights of the victim will continue to be
subservient to a sweeping view which has incrementally but comprehensively set
aside attempts to enforce those rights. Controversies such as the instant case repre-
sent close calls which require looking beyond the actual facts and crime presented.
This case and ones like it, however, also involve victims who have involuntarily
suffered an extreme tragedy too deep for words, which is precisely why the pri-
vacy interests in their cases are so compelling and should at least be judged in their
individual settings. Absent such an approach, these victims, their families, and
other observers can only wonder if the Court itself "[c]an't seem to face up to the
facts"182 of sexual assault and the policy considerations which accompany it.
Victor Arnell DuBose
Victor Arnell DuBose ©
177. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, [and]. . . to be
confronted with the Witnesses against him. . . ." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
178. Hill, supra note 61, at 1267 ("The right of the public to access to official proceedings is clearly not of the
same magnitude as the right of a person proceeded against to insist upon public access.").
179. 457 U.S. at 608.
180. Id.
181. 109S. Ct. at 2613.
182. Talking Heads, Psycho Killer, Stop Making Sense (LP record version, 1985).
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